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2-year FRN auction of 24 June 2026 (reopening)

The 2-year FRN sold $28 billion at a high discount margin of 0.079% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 2.99.

Announced
Issued
Matures

Discount margin

0.079%

Median discount margin 0.069%

Bid-to-cover

2.99

▼ −0.50 since 27 May

Sold

$28.00 billion

$28 billion offered

Indirect bidders

66.7%

Of competitive bids accepted

The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 2022

Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %

The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 202236 auctions from 26 July 2023 to 24 June 2026; the latest at 0.079%.0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.3%2023202420252026This auction, 0.079%The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 202236 auctions from 26 July 2023 to 24 June 2026; the latest at 0.079%.0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.3%2024202520260.079%

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

The 36 auctions as a table
Discount margin and bid-to-cover of the last 36 2-year FRN auctions, newest first
AuctionDiscount margin, %Bid-to-cover
0.0792.99
0.0893.49
0.1033.52
0.1152.78
0.0993.01
0.0993.16
0.1393.75
0.1683.03
0.1903.63
0.2003.15
0.1953.22
0.1592.81
0.1572.79
0.1442.95
0.1602.69
0.1052.87
0.0902.72
0.0983.01
0.1402.98
0.1702.86
0.2052.95
0.2612.86
0.2352.65
0.1823.25
0.1552.92
0.1393.40
0.1503.33
0.1903.22
0.2002.99
0.2453.61
0.2502.93
0.2002.84
0.1703.23
0.1803.42
0.1652.42
0.1252.58

Against its own history

Against the previous 12 auctions of the 2-year FRN
MeasureThis auctionMedianHigherLower
Bid-to-cover ratio2.993.169 of 123 of 12
High discount margin0.0790.14812 of 120 of 12
Indirect bidders' share66.765.64 of 128 of 12
Direct bidders' share0.00.79 of 120 of 12
Primary dealers' share33.334.38 of 124 of 12
High minus median, basis points1.01.47 of 123 of 12

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Who bought the 2-year FRN?

Indirect bidders took 66.7% of the competitive bids accepted

Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 27 May 2026

Indirect bidders took 66.7% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 66.7%, Direct bidders 0.0%, Primary dealers 33.3%Indirect bidders66.7%72.4%Direct bidders0.0%0.7%Primary dealers33.3%26.8%Indirect bidders took 66.7% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 66.7%, Direct bidders 0.0%, Primary dealers 33.3%Indirect bidders66.7%72.4%Direct bidders0.0%0.7%Primary dealers33.3%26.8%
The shares as a table
Shares of competitive bids accepted, %
BidderThis auctionPrevious
Indirect bidders66.772.4
Direct bidders0.00.7
Primary dealers33.326.8

About these figures

Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources

Treasury's published result

FieldValue
Offered as1-Year 10-Month, reopening
Offering amount$28,000,000,000
Bids received$83,614,087,200
Sold$28,000,162,200
Competitive bids accepted$27,981,075,000
Non-competitive bids accepted$19,087,200
Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on$0
Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive$0
Discount margin, %0.079
Median rate, %0.069
Low rate, %0.039
Interest rate (coupon), %–
Spread, %0.103
Bids at the high rate filled, %75.49
Bid-to-cover ratio2.99
Indirect bidders accepted$18,649,900,000
Direct bidders accepted$0
Primary dealers accepted$9,331,175,000
Indirect bidders' share, % (ours)66.7
Direct bidders' share, % (ours)0.0
Primary dealers' share, % (ours)33.3
High minus median, basis points (ours)1.0

Treasury's own files: announcement (PDF) · results (PDF)

How to read this result

The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.

What this number cannot tell you

  • Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
  • The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
  • Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
  • Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.

The longer windows

Each measure against earlier 2-year FRN auctions: how many were higher and lower, and their median
MeasureThis auctionWindowHigherLowerMedian
Bid-to-cover ratio2.99Last 24 auctions11 of 2413 of 242.96
Bid-to-cover ratio2.99All 151 since 29 January 201495 of 15153 of 1513.16
High discount margin0.079Last 24 auctions24 of 240 of 240.156
High discount margin0.079All 151 since 29 January 201491 of 15160 of 1510.105
Indirect bidders' share66.7Last 24 auctions9 of 2415 of 2465.6
Indirect bidders' share66.7All 151 since 29 January 201430 of 151121 of 15153.3
Direct bidders' share0.0Last 24 auctions21 of 240 of 240.9
Direct bidders' share0.0All 151 since 29 January 2014132 of 1510 of 1511.1
Primary dealers' share33.3Last 24 auctions14 of 2410 of 2434.1
Primary dealers' share33.3All 151 since 29 January 2014115 of 15136 of 15142.8
High minus median, basis points1.0Last 24 auctions17 of 244 of 241.5
High minus median, basis points1.0All 151 since 29 January 201477 of 15160 of 1511.1

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Sources

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

Shares of competitive bids, grades against earlier auctions and the high-minus-median spread are computed by 500metrics from Treasury's published fields; how.

How to cite this

U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 24 June 2026. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2026/R_20260624_2.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 24 June 2026 (reopening)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2026-06-24.

Sources and licence

Sources and licence

  • U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government

Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.