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2-year FRN auction of 27 May 2026 (reopening)

The 2-year FRN sold $28 billion at a high discount margin of 0.089% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 3.49.

Announced
Issued
Matures

Discount margin

0.089%

Median discount margin 0.080%

Bid-to-cover

3.49

▼ −0.03 since 28 Apr

Sold

$28.00 billion

$28 billion offered

Indirect bidders

72.4%

Of competitive bids accepted

The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 2022

Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %

The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 202236 auctions from 28 June 2023 to 27 May 2026; the latest at 0.089%.0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.3%2023202420252026This auction, 0.089%The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 202236 auctions from 28 June 2023 to 27 May 2026; the latest at 0.089%.0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.3%2024202520260.089%

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

The 36 auctions as a table
Discount margin and bid-to-cover of the last 36 2-year FRN auctions, newest first
AuctionDiscount margin, %Bid-to-cover
0.0893.49
0.1033.52
0.1152.78
0.0993.01
0.0993.16
0.1393.75
0.1683.03
0.1903.63
0.2003.15
0.1953.22
0.1592.81
0.1572.79
0.1442.95
0.1602.69
0.1052.87
0.0902.72
0.0983.01
0.1402.98
0.1702.86
0.2052.95
0.2612.86
0.2352.65
0.1823.25
0.1552.92
0.1393.40
0.1503.33
0.1903.22
0.2002.99
0.2453.61
0.2502.93
0.2002.84
0.1703.23
0.1803.42
0.1652.42
0.1252.58
0.1343.39

Against its own history

Against the previous 12 auctions of the 2-year FRN
MeasureThis auctionMedianHigherLower
Bid-to-cover ratio3.493.093 of 129 of 12
High discount margin0.0890.15012 of 120 of 12
Indirect bidders' share72.464.61 of 1211 of 12
Direct bidders' share0.70.75 of 127 of 12
Primary dealers' share26.834.611 of 121 of 12
High minus median, basis points0.91.410 of 121 of 12

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Who bought the 2-year FRN?

Indirect bidders took 72.4% of the competitive bids accepted

Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 28 April 2026

Indirect bidders took 72.4% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 72.4%, Direct bidders 0.7%, Primary dealers 26.8%Indirect bidders72.4%65.7%Direct bidders0.7%0.0%Primary dealers26.8%34.3%Indirect bidders took 72.4% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 72.4%, Direct bidders 0.7%, Primary dealers 26.8%Indirect bidders72.4%65.7%Direct bidders0.7%0.0%Primary dealers26.8%34.3%
The shares as a table
Shares of competitive bids accepted, %
BidderThis auctionPrevious
Indirect bidders72.465.7
Direct bidders0.70.0
Primary dealers26.834.3

About these figures

Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources

Treasury's published result

FieldValue
Offered as1-Year 11-Month, reopening
Offering amount$28,000,000,000
Bids received$97,784,883,700
Sold$28,000,453,000
Competitive bids accepted$27,979,569,300
Non-competitive bids accepted$20,883,700
Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on$0
Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive$0
Discount margin, %0.089
Median rate, %0.080
Low rate, %0.050
Interest rate (coupon), %–
Spread, %0.103
Bids at the high rate filled, %53.61
Bid-to-cover ratio3.49
Indirect bidders accepted$20,269,569,300
Direct bidders accepted$200,000,000
Primary dealers accepted$7,510,000,000
Indirect bidders' share, % (ours)72.4
Direct bidders' share, % (ours)0.7
Primary dealers' share, % (ours)26.8
High minus median, basis points (ours)0.9

Treasury's own files: announcement (PDF) · results (PDF)

How to read this result

The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.

What this number cannot tell you

  • Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
  • The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
  • Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
  • Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.

The longer windows

Each measure against earlier 2-year FRN auctions: how many were higher and lower, and their median
MeasureThis auctionWindowHigherLowerMedian
Bid-to-cover ratio3.49Last 24 auctions3 of 2421 of 242.96
Bid-to-cover ratio3.49All 150 since 29 January 201438 of 150111 of 1503.16
High discount margin0.089Last 24 auctions24 of 240 of 240.156
High discount margin0.089All 150 since 29 January 201484 of 15066 of 1500.107
Indirect bidders' share72.4Last 24 auctions4 of 2420 of 2465.5
Indirect bidders' share72.4All 150 since 29 January 201412 of 150138 of 15053.3
Direct bidders' share0.7Last 24 auctions16 of 248 of 240.9
Direct bidders' share0.7All 150 since 29 January 201497 of 15053 of 1501.1
Primary dealers' share26.8Last 24 auctions20 of 244 of 2434.2
Primary dealers' share26.8All 150 since 29 January 2014138 of 15012 of 15043.0
High minus median, basis points0.9Last 24 auctions21 of 241 of 241.5
High minus median, basis points0.9All 150 since 29 January 201491 of 15049 of 1501.1

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Sources

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

Shares of competitive bids, grades against earlier auctions and the high-minus-median spread are computed by 500metrics from Treasury's published fields; how.

How to cite this

U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 27 May 2026. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2026/R_20260527_1.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 27 May 2026 (reopening)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2026-05-27.

Sources and licence

Sources and licence

  • U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government

Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.