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2-year FRN auction of 23 September 2026 (reopening)

The 2-year FRN sold $28 billion at a high discount margin of 0.040% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 2.63.

Announced
Issued
Matures

Discount margin

0.040%

Median discount margin 0.010%

Bid-to-cover

2.63

▼ −0.51 since 26 Aug

Sold

$28.00 billion

$28 billion offered

Indirect bidders

59.1%

Of competitive bids accepted

The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 2022

Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %

The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 202236 auctions from 25 October 2023 to 23 September 2026; the latest at 0.040%.0.0%0.1%0.2%0.3%2023202420252026This auction, 0.040%The high discount margin was the lowest for a 2-year FRN since 27 July 202236 auctions from 25 October 2023 to 23 September 2026; the latest at 0.040%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.3%202520260.040%

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

The 36 auctions as a table
Discount margin and bid-to-cover of the last 36 2-year FRN auctions, newest first
AuctionDiscount margin, %Bid-to-cover
0.0402.63
0.0553.14
0.0503.37
0.0792.99
0.0893.49
0.1033.52
0.1152.78
0.0993.01
0.0993.16
0.1393.75
0.1683.03
0.1903.63
0.2003.15
0.1953.22
0.1592.81
0.1572.79
0.1442.95
0.1602.69
0.1052.87
0.0902.72
0.0983.01
0.1402.98
0.1702.86
0.2052.95
0.2612.86
0.2352.65
0.1823.25
0.1552.92
0.1393.40
0.1503.33
0.1903.22
0.2002.99
0.2453.61
0.2502.93
0.2002.84
0.1703.23

Against its own history

Against the previous 12 auctions of the 2-year FRN
MeasureThis auctionMedianHigherLower
Bid-to-cover ratio2.633.1612 of 120 of 12
High discount margin0.0400.10112 of 120 of 12
Indirect bidders' share59.165.710 of 122 of 12
Direct bidders' share0.00.58 of 120 of 12
Primary dealers' share40.934.02 of 1210 of 12
High minus median, basis points3.01.20 of 1212 of 12

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

  • Bid-to-cover ratio: Lowest for a 2-year FRN since 23 August 2023 (36 auctions in between).
  • High minus median, basis points: Highest for a 2-year FRN since 23 April 2025 (16 auctions in between).

Who bought the 2-year FRN?

Indirect bidders took 59.1% of the competitive bids accepted

Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 26 August 2026

Indirect bidders took 59.1% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 59.1%, Direct bidders 0.0%, Primary dealers 40.9%Indirect bidders59.1%66.6%Direct bidders0.0%0.4%Primary dealers40.9%33.1%Indirect bidders took 59.1% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 59.1%, Direct bidders 0.0%, Primary dealers 40.9%Indirect bidders59.1%66.6%Direct bidders0.0%0.4%Primary dealers40.9%33.1%
The shares as a table
Shares of competitive bids accepted, %
BidderThis auctionPrevious
Indirect bidders59.166.6
Direct bidders0.00.4
Primary dealers40.933.1

About these figures

Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources

Treasury's published result

2-year FRN auction of 23 September 2026: Treasury's published result, with our shares and spread marked "ours"
FieldValue
Offered as1-Year 10-Month, reopening
Offering amount$28,000,000,000
Bids received$73,508,324,500
Sold$28,000,087,000
Competitive bids accepted$27,989,762,500
Non-competitive bids accepted$10,324,500
Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on$0
Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive$0
Discount margin, %0.040
Median rate, %0.010
Low rate, %-0.035
Interest rate (coupon), %–
Spread, %0.050
Bids at the high rate filled, %42.15
Bid-to-cover ratio2.63
Indirect bidders accepted$16,537,912,500
Direct bidders accepted$0
Primary dealers accepted$11,451,850,000
Indirect bidders' share, % (ours)59.1
Direct bidders' share, % (ours)0.0
Primary dealers' share, % (ours)40.9
High minus median, basis points (ours)3.0

Treasury's own files: announcement (PDF) · results (PDF)

How to read this result

The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.

What this number cannot tell you

  • Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
  • The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
  • Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
  • Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.

The longer windows

Each measure against earlier 2-year FRN auctions: how many were higher and lower, and their median
MeasureThis auctionWindowHigherLowerMedian
Bid-to-cover ratio2.63Last 24 auctions24 of 240 of 243.00
Bid-to-cover ratio2.63All 154 since 29 January 2014145 of 1549 of 1543.16
High discount margin0.040Last 24 auctions24 of 240 of 240.140
High discount margin0.040All 154 since 29 January 2014130 of 15424 of 1540.101
Indirect bidders' share59.1Last 24 auctions19 of 245 of 2465.7
Indirect bidders' share59.1All 154 since 29 January 201465 of 15489 of 15453.9
Direct bidders' share0.0Last 24 auctions20 of 240 of 240.8
Direct bidders' share0.0All 154 since 29 January 2014134 of 1540 of 1541.1
Primary dealers' share40.9Last 24 auctions5 of 2419 of 2434.0
Primary dealers' share40.9All 154 since 29 January 201486 of 15468 of 15442.7
High minus median, basis points3.0Last 24 auctions1 of 2422 of 241.5
High minus median, basis points3.0All 154 since 29 January 201413 of 154134 of 1541.1

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Sources

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

Shares of competitive bids, grades against earlier auctions and the high-minus-median spread are computed by 500metrics from Treasury's published fields; how.

How to cite this

U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 23 September 2026. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2026/R_20260923_2.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 23 September 2026 (reopening)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2026-09-23.

Sources and licence

Sources and licence

  • U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government

Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.