2-year FRN auction of 29 May 2019 (reopening)
The 2-year FRN sold $19.891 billion at a high discount margin of 0.140% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 2.84.
- Announced
- Issued
- Matures
Discount margin
0.140%
Bid-to-cover
2.84
▲ +0.16 since 24 Apr
Sold
$19.89 billion
Indirect bidders
39.8%
Discount margin at the last 36 2-year FRN auctions
Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %
Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .
The 36 auctions as a table
| Auction | Discount margin, % | Bid-to-cover |
|---|---|---|
| 0.140 | 2.84 | |
| 0.139 | 2.68 | |
| 0.180 | 3.78 | |
| 0.149 | 2.70 | |
| 0.115 | 2.89 | |
| 0.150 | 2.71 | |
| 0.050 | 2.62 | |
| 0.045 | 3.32 | |
| 0.050 | 3.06 | |
| 0.047 | 2.94 | |
| 0.043 | 2.79 | |
| 0.042 | 2.79 | |
| 0.028 | 3.26 | |
| 0.033 | 3.65 | |
| 0.049 | 2.78 | |
| 0.016 | 2.75 | |
| 0.000 | 3.38 | |
| 0.035 | 3.26 | |
| 0.035 | 3.69 | |
| 0.048 | 3.56 | |
| 0.055 | 3.46 | |
| 0.060 | 3.09 | |
| 0.060 | 3.32 | |
| 0.080 | 3.13 | |
| 0.050 | 2.99 | |
| 0.070 | 3.35 | |
| 0.109 | 3.43 | |
| 0.133 | 3.08 | |
| 0.140 | 3.16 | |
| 0.169 | 3.80 | |
| 0.169 | 3.32 | |
| 0.170 | 3.35 | |
| 0.180 | 3.09 | |
| 0.165 | 3.46 | |
| 0.174 | 3.82 | |
| 0.188 | 3.15 |
Against its own history
| Measure | This auction | Median | Higher | Lower |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bid-to-cover ratio | 2.84 | 2.84 | 6 of 12 | 6 of 12 |
| High discount margin | 0.140 | 0.050 | 3 of 12 | 9 of 12 |
| Indirect bidders' share | 39.8 | 50.4 | 8 of 12 | 4 of 12 |
| Direct bidders' share | 2.9 | 3.5 | 6 of 12 | 6 of 12 |
| Primary dealers' share | 57.3 | 48.0 | 2 of 12 | 10 of 12 |
| High minus median, basis points | 1.0 | 1.0 | 5 of 12 | 4 of 12 |
The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.
Who bought the 2-year FRN?
Primary dealers took 57.3% of the competitive bids accepted
Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 24 April 2019
The shares as a table
| Bidder | This auction | Previous |
|---|---|---|
| Indirect bidders | 39.8 | 38.5 |
| Direct bidders | 2.9 | 1.3 |
| Primary dealers | 57.3 | 60.2 |
About these figures
Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources
Treasury's published result
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Offered as | 1-Year 11-Month, reopening |
| Offering amount | $18,000,000,000 |
| Bids received | $53,081,157,700 |
| Sold | $19,890,932,700 |
| Competitive bids accepted | $17,991,775,000 |
| Non-competitive bids accepted | $8,293,600 |
| Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on | $1,890,864,100 |
| Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive | $0 |
| Discount margin, % | 0.140 |
| Median rate, % | 0.130 |
| Low rate, % | 0.080 |
| Interest rate (coupon), % | – |
| Spread, % | 0.139 |
| Bids at the high rate filled, % | 94.23 |
| Bid-to-cover ratio | 2.84 |
| Indirect bidders accepted | $7,164,680,000 |
| Direct bidders accepted | $521,150,000 |
| Primary dealers accepted | $10,305,945,000 |
| Indirect bidders' share, % (ours) | 39.8 |
| Direct bidders' share, % (ours) | 2.9 |
| Primary dealers' share, % (ours) | 57.3 |
| High minus median, basis points (ours) | 1.0 |
How to read this result
The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.
What this number cannot tell you
- Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
- The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
- Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
- Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.
The longer windows
| Measure | This auction | Window | Higher | Lower | Median |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bid-to-cover ratio | 2.84 | Last 24 auctions | 16 of 24 | 8 of 24 | 3.08 |
| Bid-to-cover ratio | 2.84 | All 64 since 29 January 2014 | 56 of 64 | 8 of 64 | 3.40 |
| High discount margin | 0.140 | Last 24 auctions | 3 of 24 | 21 of 24 | 0.050 |
| High discount margin | 0.140 | All 64 since 29 January 2014 | 18 of 64 | 45 of 64 | 0.075 |
| Indirect bidders' share | 39.8 | Last 24 auctions | 17 of 24 | 7 of 24 | 49.5 |
| Indirect bidders' share | 39.8 | All 64 since 29 January 2014 | 44 of 64 | 20 of 64 | 46.6 |
| Direct bidders' share | 2.9 | Last 24 auctions | 9 of 24 | 15 of 24 | 1.0 |
| Direct bidders' share | 2.9 | All 64 since 29 January 2014 | 25 of 64 | 39 of 64 | 1.9 |
| Primary dealers' share | 57.3 | Last 24 auctions | 5 of 24 | 19 of 24 | 48.5 |
| Primary dealers' share | 57.3 | All 64 since 29 January 2014 | 18 of 64 | 46 of 64 | 50.5 |
| High minus median, basis points | 1.0 | Last 24 auctions | 9 of 24 | 11 of 24 | 1.0 |
| High minus median, basis points | 1.0 | All 64 since 29 January 2014 | 24 of 64 | 36 of 64 | 0.9 |
The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.
Sources
Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .
How to cite this
U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 29 May 2019. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2019/R_20190529_1.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 29 May 2019 (reopening)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2019-05-29.
Sources and licence
Sources and licence
- U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government
Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.