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2-year FRN auction of 29 April 2015 (new issue)

The 2-year FRN sold $15.055 billion at a high discount margin of 0.074% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 3.81.

Announced
Issued
Matures

Discount margin

0.074%

Median discount margin 0.065%

Bid-to-cover

3.81

▼ −0.53 since 25 Mar

Sold

$15.05 billion

$15 billion offered

Indirect bidders

62.7%

Of competitive bids accepted

Discount margin at the last 16 2-year FRN auctions

Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %

Discount margin at the last 16 2-year FRN auctions16 auctions from 29 January 2014 to 29 April 2015; the latest at 0.074%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%20142015This auction, 0.074%Discount margin at the last 16 2-year FRN auctions16 auctions from 29 January 2014 to 29 April 2015; the latest at 0.074%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%201420150.074%

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

The 16 auctions as a table
Discount margin and bid-to-cover of the last 16 2-year FRN auctions, newest first
AuctionDiscount margin, %Bid-to-cover
0.0743.81
0.0854.34
0.0844.28
0.0843.72
0.1102.90
0.0684.00
0.0533.58
0.0414.45
0.0554.38
0.0704.09
0.0694.43
0.0634.69
0.0694.64
0.0694.67
0.0645.29
0.0455.67

Against its own history

Against the previous 12 auctions of the 2-year FRN
MeasureThis auctionMedianHigherLower
Bid-to-cover ratio3.814.319 of 123 of 12
High discount margin0.0740.0694 of 128 of 12
Indirect bidders' share62.746.61 of 1211 of 12
Direct bidders' share0.44.711 of 121 of 12
Primary dealers' share36.949.911 of 121 of 12
High minus median, basis points0.90.31 of 1211 of 12

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Who bought the 2-year FRN?

Indirect bidders took 62.7% of the competitive bids accepted

Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 25 March 2015

Indirect bidders took 62.7% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 62.7%, Direct bidders 0.4%, Primary dealers 36.9%Indirect bidders62.7%75.5%Direct bidders0.4%0.0%Primary dealers36.9%24.5%Indirect bidders took 62.7% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 62.7%, Direct bidders 0.4%, Primary dealers 36.9%Indirect bidders62.7%75.5%Direct bidders0.4%0.0%Primary dealers36.9%24.5%
The shares as a table
Shares of competitive bids accepted, %
BidderThis auctionPrevious
Indirect bidders62.775.5
Direct bidders0.40.0
Primary dealers36.924.5

About these figures

Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources

Treasury's published result

2-year FRN auction of 29 April 2015: Treasury's published result, with our shares and spread marked "ours"
FieldValue
Offered as2-Year, new issue
Offering amount$15,000,000,000
Bids received$57,198,276,400
Sold$15,054,921,400
Competitive bids accepted$14,987,645,000
Non-competitive bids accepted$12,405,600
Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on$54,870,800
Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive$0
Discount margin, %0.074
Median rate, %0.065
Low rate, %0.050
Interest rate (coupon), %–
Spread, %0.074
Bids at the high rate filled, %63.49
Bid-to-cover ratio3.81
Indirect bidders accepted$9,397,980,000
Direct bidders accepted$63,490,000
Primary dealers accepted$5,526,175,000
Indirect bidders' share, % (ours)62.7
Direct bidders' share, % (ours)0.4
Primary dealers' share, % (ours)36.9
High minus median, basis points (ours)0.9

Treasury's own files: announcement (PDF) · results (PDF)

How to read this result

The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.

What this number cannot tell you

  • Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
  • The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
  • Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
  • Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.

The longer windows

Each measure against earlier 2-year FRN auctions: how many were higher and lower, and their median
MeasureThis auctionWindowHigherLowerMedian
Bid-to-cover ratio3.81All 15 since 29 January 201412 of 153 of 154.38
High discount margin0.074All 15 since 29 January 20144 of 1511 of 150.069
Indirect bidders' share62.7All 15 since 29 January 20141 of 1514 of 1546.5
Direct bidders' share0.4All 15 since 29 January 201414 of 151 of 154.8
Primary dealers' share36.9All 15 since 29 January 201414 of 151 of 1550.1
High minus median, basis points0.9All 15 since 29 January 20141 of 1514 of 150.3

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Sources

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

Shares of competitive bids, grades against earlier auctions and the high-minus-median spread are computed by 500metrics from Treasury's published fields; how.

How to cite this

U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 29 April 2015. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2015/R_20150429_1.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 29 April 2015 (new issue)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2015-04-29.

Sources and licence

Sources and licence

  • U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government

Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.