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2-year FRN auction of 25 February 2015 (reopening)

The 2-year FRN sold $13 billion at a high discount margin of 0.084% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 4.28.

Announced
Issued
Matures

Discount margin

0.084%

Median discount margin 0.081%

Bid-to-cover

4.28

▲ +0.56 since 28 Jan

Sold

$13.00 billion

$13 billion offered

Indirect bidders

48.2%

Of competitive bids accepted

Discount margin at the last 14 2-year FRN auctions

Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %

Discount margin at the last 14 2-year FRN auctions14 auctions from 29 January 2014 to 25 February 2015; the latest at 0.084%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%20142015This auction, 0.084%Discount margin at the last 14 2-year FRN auctions14 auctions from 29 January 2014 to 25 February 2015; the latest at 0.084%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%201420150.084%

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

The 14 auctions as a table
Discount margin and bid-to-cover of the last 14 2-year FRN auctions, newest first
AuctionDiscount margin, %Bid-to-cover
0.0844.28
0.0843.72
0.1102.90
0.0684.00
0.0533.58
0.0414.45
0.0554.38
0.0704.09
0.0694.43
0.0634.69
0.0694.64
0.0694.67
0.0645.29
0.0455.67

Against its own history

Against the previous 12 auctions of the 2-year FRN
MeasureThis auctionMedianHigherLower
Bid-to-cover ratio4.284.407 of 125 of 12
High discount margin0.0840.0681 of 1210 of 12
Indirect bidders' share48.244.12 of 1210 of 12
Direct bidders' share1.94.912 of 120 of 12
Primary dealers' share49.950.18 of 124 of 12
High minus median, basis points0.30.35 of 123 of 12

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

  • Direct bidders' share: Lowest of all 13 earlier 2-year FRN auctions we hold.

Who bought the 2-year FRN?

Primary dealers took 49.9% of the competitive bids accepted

Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 28 January 2015

Primary dealers took 49.9% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 48.2%, Direct bidders 1.9%, Primary dealers 49.9%Indirect bidders48.2%47.1%Direct bidders1.9%6.9%Primary dealers49.9%46.0%Primary dealers took 49.9% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 48.2%, Direct bidders 1.9%, Primary dealers 49.9%Indirect bidders48.2%47.1%Direct bidders1.9%6.9%Primary dealers49.9%46.0%
The shares as a table
Shares of competitive bids accepted, %
BidderThis auctionPrevious
Indirect bidders48.247.1
Direct bidders1.96.9
Primary dealers49.946.0

About these figures

Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources

Treasury's published result

FieldValue
Offered as1-Year 11-Month, reopening
Offering amount$13,000,000,000
Bids received$55,664,267,100
Sold$13,000,305,100
Competitive bids accepted$12,991,038,000
Non-competitive bids accepted$9,267,100
Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on$0
Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive$0
Discount margin, %0.084
Median rate, %0.081
Low rate, %0.060
Interest rate (coupon), %–
Spread, %0.084
Bids at the high rate filled, %38.60
Bid-to-cover ratio4.28
Indirect bidders accepted$6,262,838,000
Direct bidders accepted$250,000,000
Primary dealers accepted$6,478,200,000
Indirect bidders' share, % (ours)48.2
Direct bidders' share, % (ours)1.9
Primary dealers' share, % (ours)49.9
High minus median, basis points (ours)0.3

Treasury's own files: announcement (PDF) · results (PDF)

How to read this result

The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.

What this number cannot tell you

  • Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
  • The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
  • Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
  • Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.

The longer windows

Each measure against earlier 2-year FRN auctions: how many were higher and lower, and their median
MeasureThis auctionWindowHigherLowerMedian
Bid-to-cover ratio4.28All 13 since 29 January 20148 of 135 of 134.43
High discount margin0.084All 13 since 29 January 20141 of 1311 of 130.068
Indirect bidders' share48.2All 13 since 29 January 20142 of 1311 of 1341.7
Direct bidders' share1.9All 13 since 29 January 201413 of 130 of 135.1
Primary dealers' share49.9All 13 since 29 January 20149 of 134 of 1350.2
High minus median, basis points0.3All 13 since 29 January 20146 of 133 of 130.3

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Sources

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

Shares of competitive bids, grades against earlier auctions and the high-minus-median spread are computed by 500metrics from Treasury's published fields; how.

How to cite this

U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 25 February 2015. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2015/R_20150225_1.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 25 February 2015 (reopening)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2015-02-25.

Sources and licence

Sources and licence

  • U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government

Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.