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2-year FRN auction of 25 June 2014 (reopening)

The 2-year FRN sold $13 billion at a high discount margin of 0.069% on , with a bid-to-cover ratio of 4.43.

Announced
Issued
Matures

Discount margin

0.069%

Median discount margin 0.065%

Bid-to-cover

4.43

▼ −0.26 since 28 May

Sold

$13.00 billion

$13 billion offered

Indirect bidders

40.1%

Of competitive bids accepted

Discount margin at the last 6 2-year FRN auctions

Discount margin at each 2-year FRN auction, %

Discount margin at the last 6 2-year FRN auctions6 auctions from 29 January 2014 to 25 June 2014; the latest at 0.069%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%2014This auction, 0.069%Discount margin at the last 6 2-year FRN auctions6 auctions from 29 January 2014 to 25 June 2014; the latest at 0.069%.0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%20140.069%

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

The 6 auctions as a table
Discount margin and bid-to-cover of the last 6 2-year FRN auctions, newest first
AuctionDiscount margin, %Bid-to-cover
0.0694.43
0.0634.69
0.0694.64
0.0694.67
0.0645.29
0.0455.67

Against its own history

Against every earlier 2-year FRN auction we hold
MeasureThis auctionMedianHigherLower
Bid-to-cover ratio4.434.695 of 50 of 5
High discount margin0.0690.0640 of 53 of 5
Indirect bidders' share40.137.81 of 54 of 5
Direct bidders' share5.15.73 of 52 of 5
Primary dealers' share54.854.62 of 53 of 5
High minus median, basis points0.40.41 of 52 of 5

The table scrolls sideways; the first column stays in place.

Who bought the 2-year FRN?

Primary dealers took 54.8% of the competitive bids accepted

Share of competitive bids accepted, %. Grey: the previous 2-year FRN auction, 28 May 2014

Primary dealers took 54.8% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 40.1%, Direct bidders 5.1%, Primary dealers 54.8%Indirect bidders40.1%41.7%Direct bidders5.1%9.4%Primary dealers54.8%48.9%Primary dealers took 54.8% of the competitive bids acceptedIndirect bidders 40.1%, Direct bidders 5.1%, Primary dealers 54.8%Indirect bidders40.1%41.7%Direct bidders5.1%9.4%Primary dealers54.8%48.9%
The shares as a table
Shares of competitive bids accepted, %
BidderThis auctionPrevious
Indirect bidders40.141.7
Direct bidders5.19.4
Primary dealers54.848.9

About these figures

Treasury's full result, how to read it, its limits and sources

Treasury's published result

FieldValue
Offered as1-Year 10-Month, reopening
Offering amount$13,000,000,000
Bids received$57,560,501,500
Sold$13,000,391,500
Competitive bids accepted$12,989,590,000
Non-competitive bids accepted$10,801,500
Federal Reserve (SOMA) add-on$0
Foreign and international (FIMA) non-competitive$0
Discount margin, %0.069
Median rate, %0.065
Low rate, %0.050
Interest rate (coupon), %–
Spread, %0.069
Bids at the high rate filled, %30.28
Bid-to-cover ratio4.43
Indirect bidders accepted$5,209,880,000
Direct bidders accepted$657,570,000
Primary dealers accepted$7,122,140,000
Indirect bidders' share, % (ours)40.1
Direct bidders' share, % (ours)5.1
Primary dealers' share, % (ours)54.8
High minus median, basis points (ours)0.4

Treasury's own files: announcement (PDF) · results (PDF)

How to read this result

The high discount margin is the highest rate Treasury accepted; every winning bidder gets it. The bid-to-cover ratio is bids received divided by the amount sold. Shares are of competitive bids accepted. High minus median shows how far the accepted cut-off sat above the middle accepted bid; it is not the market's auction tail, which needs a when-issued price that is not public.

What this number cannot tell you

  • Why it sold where it did. Results show what was bid and accepted, not the reasons behind any bid.
  • The auction tail as markets quote it. That compares the high yield with the when-issued yield just before bids closed, a market price that is not public; we show high minus median instead, a different measure.
  • Who the bidders are. Indirect bidders include foreign and international accounts bidding through the New York Fed and investors bidding through dealers; Treasury does not publish names.
  • Demand on another day. A bid-to-cover ratio counts bids at one auction against the amount offered, and the amount offered changes from auction to auction.

Sources

Source: U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data. Observed .

Shares of competitive bids, grades against earlier auctions and the high-minus-median spread are computed by 500metrics from Treasury's published fields; how.

How to cite this

U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data, Treasury Securities Auctions Data, auction of 25 June 2014. Results file: https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/2014/R_20140625_1.pdf. Compiled by 500metrics, "2-year FRN auction of 25 June 2014 (reopening)", https://500metrics.com/treasury/auctions/2-year-frn/2014-06-25.

Sources and licence

Sources and licence

  • U.S. Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Data (source). Licence: Public domain, a work of the US federal government

Our text and compilation: CC BY 4.0. How to reuse and cite this page.